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I. INTRODUCTION
We stand at the cusp of the creation of a new medium. Throughout the
industrialized world, the deployment of innovative new technologies-such as
high-capacity computer networks, mobile wireless communications services,
television systems with hundreds of channels, and increasingly accessible
online services-heralds the arrival of new, interactive communications
media.' At this formative stage in the development of these new modes of
communication, it is appropriate to ask: What impact will these changes have
on freedom of expression? How can these new technological possibilities be
made to serve such core First Amendment values as increasing access to
diverse information sources and minimizing government regulation of speech?
The shape of these new media is not yet defined. Indeed, there are still
choices to be made about the "architecture"-that is, the basic design and
functional capabilities-of the emerging network.2 Those choices will have a
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1. Throughout this Essay, we use the terms "new media" and "interactive media" to represent a broad
conception of the future communications media. While the ultimate shape of these media remains unclear.
their features will most likely include: (1) digital communications, whereby sound. video, text. and other
information are all transmitted as bits--or numbers-rather than in their analog form; (2) the convergence
of traditionally distinct media-such as television, telephones, and computer networks--into overlapping
or common modes of communication; (3) increasingly interactive communications, rather than the one-way
transmissions typifying most television and radio today; and (4) new physical transport mechanisms, such
as fiber optics, high-capacity copper wires, or high-bandwidth satellite transmissions, with the potential for
dramatically greater capacity than is available today. The most striking representative of the new media in
existence today is the Internet, the rapidly evolving "network of networks" that carries computer
communications, data, text, voice, and video all over the world.
2. "Network" refers to the infrastructure that enables transmission of information in a medium. The
emerging national and international information infrastructure for the interactive media will actually be
made up of many smaller, interconnected networks.
"Network architecture" refers to the basic design and functional capabilities of this infrastructure. In
its narrowest sense, a network architecture might describe the particular physical layout or technologies of
a specific network. We use the term more generally to describe the basic capabilities and atbutes inherent
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fundamental impact on the First Amendment values relating to freedom of
expression. We argue that two key architectural features will best serve these
values: decentralized open access, and user control over content.
Our inquiry is guided by two of the enduring values that have informed
First Amendment doctrine: maximizing access to diverse information sources
and minimizing the government regulation of speech. The writings of Mill,3
Milton,4 and other Enlightenment thinkers taught the drafters of the First
Amendment the importance of assuring a diversity of information sources for
the citizenry of a democracy.5 Political debate and public culture cannot
flourish without a free, open public forum for the exchange of ideas.' Since
the middle of this century, courts and legislatures have been forced to grapple
with this issue as new media such as radio and television-as well as
increasing economic concentration in the print medium-have threatened
diversity.
The First Amendment also guards against government efforts to choose
which information sources are appropriate and which are not appropriate for
any given speaker or listener. As the Supreme Court recently noted, "At the
heart of the First Amendment lies the principle that each person should decide
for him or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration,
and adherence."8 Though there are circumstances in which restrictions on
expression are permissible, in general First Amendment values are best served
when such restrictions are kept to an absolute minimum.
in the design of the infrastructure supporting new communications media. These attributes can be a function
of technological choices as well as economic, regulatory, and legal decisions.
For example, the telephone system today has an inherently interactive, two-way architecture; with it
one can send and receive information virtually anywhere in the world. For most users its capacity is
currently low, accommodating only voice and low-speed data transmissions. By comparison, the architecture
of the cable television system is fundamentally one-way and very high capacity. However, only a small
number of entities---the cable programmers--can transmit information over the network.
3. See, e.g., JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY (photo. reprint 1992) (1859).
4. See, e.g., John Milton, Areopagitica; A Speech of Mr. John Milton for the Liberty of Unlicenc'd
Printing, to the Parliament of England (1644), in JOHN MILTON, AREOPAGITICA I (photo. reprint 1992)
(1890).
5. The Supreme Court explained the diversity goal in Associated Press v. United States, noting that
the First Amendment "rests on the assumption that the widest possible dissemination of information from
diverse and antagonistic sources is essential to the welfare of the public." 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
6. See Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union, 466 U.S. 485, 503-04 (1984) ("The First Amendment
presupposes that the freedom to speak one's mind is not only an aspect of individual liberty-thus a good
unto itself-but also is essential to the common quest for truth and the vitality of society as a whole.");
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957) ("The protection given speech and press was fashioned
to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political and social changes desired by
the people.").
7. See, e.g., Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390-92 (1969); see also Turner
Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 2456-58 (1994) (discussing "scarcity rationale" for
regulation of broadcast television and other media).
8. See Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2458; see also Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 598 (1969) ("[lhf the
First Amendment means anything, it means that a State has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his
house, what books he may read or what films he may watch.").
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How can the future interactive media best serve these values? As we
demonstrate, the diversity and regulation of various media have largely been
dictated by certain architectural features of those media. The architectural
characteristics of new interactive media offer unique opportunities for
advancing First Amendment values, as well as unique challenges to existing
First Amendment doctrines. In order for interactive media to develop with the
diversity-enhancing characteristics of a medium such as print-and to win
strong First Amendment protections from regulation like those accorded to
print-their architecture must have two key characteristics. First, the
architecture must be open and decentralized, promoting a true abundance of
information and communication opportunities. Second, there must be sufficient
user control to enable users to choose what information they want to receive,
and what they want to keep out, thus eliminating the rationale for government
to step in and protect various parts of society with intrusive content
regulations.
Throughout this Essay, we return to the print medium as a powerful
demonstration of how to achieve diversity and limit government content
regulation. For it is in print that we believe there is the greatest diversity, and
the least need for (and tolerance of) intrusive regulation. In early American
history, the printing press and a national mail system combined with a new
communications vehicle, the newspaper, and a new legal regime, the First
Amendment, to enhance the diversity of information sources available
throughout the country. At the close of the eighteenth century, the diversity,
flexibility, and accessibility of this new communications medium was
important to the health and growth of American democracy. Now, at the close
of the twentieth century, we should seek a similarly potent combination of
technology and public policy that will enable interactive media to fulfill their
democratic potential.
II. ABUNDANCE: ARCHITECTURAL CHARACTERISTICS OF INTERACTIVE
NETWORKS THAT PROMOTE DIVERSITY
To reach a First Amendment regime in new media that truly promotes
diversity, there must be enough capacity to carry a genuine abundance of
information. In the print medium there has been no limit to the number of
newspapers, books, magazines, pamphlets, broadsides, and other materials that
can circulate among the public. As many commentators have chronicled, the
arrival of radio and broadcast television marked the first instance in the history
of the First Amendment when courts found a compelling government interest
in regulating access to a medium to ensure that its scarce resources would be
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shared among the communicating public in a fair and orderly manner.9 If a
-new medium were to provide an abundance of communication opportunities,
and if no single entity (public or private) could control the communications
access, then the means of achieving diversity of sources would be radically
different: The need for intrusive government regulation would be dramatically
reduced.
The limited communications opportunities available through today's mass
media result from two fundamental characteristics. First, given a finite number
of channels (even if the number is 500 or 1000), some entity will always have
to make choices about who is allowed to use a given channel. The economic
value of a channel to a network operator, such as a cable company or over-the-
air broadcaster, is likely to increase under strict access conditions. Thus,
independent communicators in a medium divided up into a finite number of
channels will always face structural barriers to entry as speakers; diversity is
not well served in such an environment. Second, the "endpoints" through
which users and content providers interact with the network will restrict
diversity of sources if those endpoints are not sufficiently open and accessible
to both information providers and information users.
The different characteristics of various media are all a function of the
underlying architecture of the network used to transport the communications
in question. The scarcity that characterizes today's mass media will be fully
replaced by abundance only when a network with the following characteristics
is in place: (1) a decentralized, open-access architecture; and (2) open
endpoints, providing easy access for all potential content providers and content
users.
A. The Decentralized Open-Access Model vs. The One-Way Channel Model
Today all mass media are based on a "channelized" architecture-that is,
an architecture with a fixed number of available channels. There may be only
a few channels, as in broadcast television, or there may be hundreds of
channels, as in new systems planned by cable television companies. The
channel model poses two inherent obstacles to achieving First Amendment
diversity goals: scarcity of communications pathways and the presence of
information gatekeepers.
As long as there is a scarcity of channels, it is likely that some viewpoints
will not be heard. An increase in the number of channels may bring a partial
increase in the diversity of sources available to the public; as a practical
matter, however, channels will be used up by the programming that brings the
channel operator the most revenue. For example, even a 500-channel cable
9. For a comprehensive treatment, see ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 108-50
(1983).
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television system is unlikely to offer 500 different programs to viewers. More
likely, some large number of channels will be used for staggered showings of
the top ten or twenty movies.'0 Under this model, even a large number of
channels will be used up relatively quickly, and a diversity problem will
remain.
The channel model poses no threat to diversity only if every potential
programmer has a channel available to use. Inasmuch as this scenario would
require a very large number of channels, many of which would often be idle,
it is difficult to imagine the market producing such a network. It is even more
unlikely given that some degree of channel scarcity drives up the price that
profit-maximizing network operators can charge for any channel slot.
The scarcity of channels and the centralized nature of a channelized
distribution network present another problem: Some entity, generally the
network owner and operator, must decide which of the large number of
potential programs will be given access to the smaller number of channels
available." This gatekeeper role is also required because the network
architecture of both cable and broadcast media demands that all programming
be collected at a central point for redistribution. This requirement presents a
significant burden for the independent content creator, who must deliver the
program content to the central facility. In addition, smaller, independent
programmers are forced to incur significant transaction costs to negotiate
carriage agreements with the network operator.
The decentralized, open-access12 model presents a sharp contrast to the
centralized, one-way channel model that typifies most mass media today',
3
Properly implemented, the open-access model holds the promise of overcoming
the diversity problems created by the centralized channel model. The open-
access model would permit a level of diversity only possible today in the print
medium. Moreover, this model's potential to lower publishing costs and
increase connectivity promises a diversity of sources undreamed of in the era
of print. The functional architecture of the open-access network model has two
important features: (1) capacity for an unlimited number of information
sources, and (2) decentralized access without the need for gatekeepers.
An open-access network can accommodate a virtually unlimited number
of information providers as well as information users. This is the case because
10. For example, almost half of the channels in a 500-channel system are used up if the network
operator shows the top 20 movies at regular 10-minute intervals.
11. See Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2466 (recognizing essential gateway role played by cable operators).
12. In 1994, the Clinton Administration proposed the addition of a new title (Title Vl1) to the
Communications Act that would provide incentives for the creation of high-capacity, digital "open-access-
networks. Clinton Administration White Paper on Communications Act Reform. 18 Daily Rep. for Execs
(BNA) M-1, M-4 (Jan. 27, 1994).
13. See Mitchell Kapor. Where Is the Digital Highway Really Heading? Thie Case for a Jeffersontan
Information Policy, WIRED, July-Aug. 1993, at 53, 57. Between 1992 and 1994 the authors worked with
Kapor at the Electronic Frontier Foundation to advance open network architecture pnnciple-. in the
telecommunications policy debate.
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the architecture of the network makes no distinction between users who are
information providers and those who are information users. In fact, most users
play both roles from time to time.14 All who obtain access have the option
of making information available to all other users on the network; thus, the
sources of information available are limited only by the number of users who
seek access. Cable television or satellite networks, in contrast, are designed to
add users relatively easily, but those users have no ability to send information
to others on the network.
Unlike the channelized networks of today's mass media, open-access
networks are decentralized: No single point is designated for the origination
of content. A single user can send information to hundreds, thousands, or even
millions of other users on the networks, without any advance negotiation or
special arrangement with the network operator. Moreover, information access
and publication tools such as those found on the Internet can be structured to
enable individuals or organizations to make their own information available
upon request by any other user on the network. Without any centralized
distribution point on the network, it is much harder for a network operator-or
any other entity-to stifle independent information sources. More important,
the decentralized nature of information distribution generates substantially
lower barriers to entry for independent information providers.
The abundance generated by such an open-access network eliminates one
of the key First Amendment diversity difficulties found in mass media. Instead
of network operators or government regulators allocating a small number of
channels among a larger number of information sources, all information
providers would have the opportunity to speak on an open-access network.
B. Open Endpoints
To serve diversity goals, an open-access network must also have open
endpoints or, in technical terms, interfaces. Every electronic medium has
unique interfaces. In the case of radio or broadcast television, the interface is
principally a set of technical specifications that define the manner in which the
signal is transmitted and received through the air, as well as the format of the
electrical signal used to represent sound and/or pictures. Access to this
technical information is critical for all who would create content for
distribution over broadcast media, and for those who build the appliances
(radios and televisions) that allow users to receive broadcast media.
The interfaces to future interactive networks, and to the Internet today, are
considerably more complicated than the corresponding interfaces to television
14. For example, anyone with a computer connected to the Internet can at one moment use services
such as Usenet newsgroups, the FTP file transfer protocol, or the World Wide Web to "publish"
information available to the whole Internet, and at the next moment use the same service to read or receive
information.
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and radio. They are just as important, however. Without access to critical
information about network interfaces, those who seek to produce content or
applications for interactive networks will be unable to do so. For example, to
write a computer program that runs on an Apple Macintosh computer, the
programmer must have access to technical information about how that
particular computer operates. Many people have been able to develop new
software, hardware, and information services over the Internet because that
network is based on open, public, technical standards.
Gaining access to future interactive networks will require knowledge of the
design of the endpoints of the networks. These endpoints, through which users
will access the networks, have the potential to become "bottlenecks."' 
5
Certain functions and technical specifications will define critical endpoint
interfaces with the network. These critical interfaces must, either by
government regulation or by industry practice, be open and available to all
who seek to use the network. Already much debate has occurred in
telecommunications policy circles about which interfaces should be open and
what "open" means.'
6
It is not possible to give a complete answer to the question of what
interfaces should be open or closed in the abstract. For the most part, market
conditions and technology have not yet developed to the point where these
questions can be answered concretely. Nevertheless, it is clear that certain
types of interfaces will have to be open in order to promote diversity.
Designers of digital networks tend to describe their interfaces in layers. Lower
layers provide for the movement of raw information across the networks.
Higher layers control the format in which that information is presented to users
and the means by which users interact with data. Openness is needed primarily
in the lower layers. Control over higher layers of the interface will be more
akin to creative editorial decisions that distinguish one content provider from
another. As long as each content provider has open access to lower-level
standards and interfaces, diverse individual providers will be able to structure
their own higher-level presentation interfaces.
15. Regulators and courts have identified the bottleneck in the telephone network of today as the
central switching facility. The decentralized nature of new communications networks may eliminate the
central switch bottleneck, but other bottlenecks may develop at the endpoints of the network,
16. In 1994, the House of Representatives found that:
[I]n order to promote diversity, competition, and technological innovation among suppliers of
equipment and services, it may be necessary to make certain critical interfaces with such
networks open and accessible to a broad range of equipment manufacturers and infomation
providers;
... The identification of critical interfaces with such networks and the assessment of their
openness must be accomplished with due recognition that open and accessible systems may
include standards that involve both nonproprietary and proprietary technologies.
H.I. 3636, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. § 205(a)(5)-(6) (1994); see also H.R. REP. No. 560. 103d Cong.. 2d Sess.
89-91 (1994).
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Perfectly open technical standards still leave other potential bottlenecks.
The network operator could restrict access to critical network endpoints by
setting restrictive licensing terms on intellectual property (e.g., software
techniques) needed to interface with the network. This strategy has been
adopted successfully by Nintendo in its bid to control the introduction of new
game cartridges. Nintendo requires producers of independent game cartridges
to license certain software programs that enable communication between the
independently produced game cartridge and the Nintendo game player. In a
long series of court battles, Nintendo's copyright claims in pursuit of this
strategy have been upheld.' 7 If such licensing practices were applied to
endpoints in the new interactive media, the potential for abundance would be
squandered.
C. The First Amendment Interest in Abundance
If citizens around the country have access to an open, decentralized
network, it may be possible to realize core democratic diversity goals without
resorting to the regulatory measures that are now essential to ensure allocation
of scarce channels in the public interest-measures that we believe are
complex, cumbersome, and less than completely effective. The most recent
example of confusion over such regulations can be found in Turner
Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC.'8 At issue in Turner were "must carry"
rules designed to create a right of access to cable networks for local broadcast
stations and public television stations.' 9 The Turner Court was confronted
with the central dilemma posed by government regulation of cable system
operators. On the one hand, courts have acknowledged that cable operators are
bona fide First Amendment speakers, whose exercise of editorial discretion in
programming selection and channel assignment deserves First Amendment
protection. 0 On the other hand, the architectural characteristics of one-way,
centralized cable networks demand some degree of government intervention to
ensure a modicum of diversity and opportunity for speakers and programmers
who do not own cable systems. 2' Regulations of the sort at issue in Turner
are not objectionable in and of themselves, but we believe they have had only
limited effectiveness in producing a true diversity of information sources.22
17. See Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc., 975 F.2d 832, 847 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (affirming
injunction sought by Nintendo barring Atari from building game cartridges compatible with Nintendo's
system).
18. 114 S. Ct. 2445 (1994).
19. See 47 U.S.C. § 534 (Supp. V 1993).
20. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2456.
21. See id. at 2466.
22. The limited effectiveness of these diversity-promoting regulations is in part a result of the closed,
channelized architecture of the cable television network. See supra text accompanying note 11.
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Again, the print realm provides an example of how to achieve diversity
without extensive regulatory intervention. Decentralized architecture is a key
to diversity in any medium. The great diversity of the early American press
was made possible, for example, because of the architecture of the printing
process and the mail system. Production of papers was easy and inexpensive.
The postal system allowed information to flow in every direction, from
seacoast cities to the hinterlands and back, and between widely dispersed
settlements.' Thus, the news that was collected reflected information about
events all over the country. Tocqueville pointed out the essential connection
between a decentralized press, diversity, and democracy:
[A]mong democratic nations the exercise of local powers cannot be
entrusted to the principal members of the community as in
aristocracies. Those powers must be either abolished or placed in the
hands of very large numbers of men, who then in fact constitute an
association permanently established by law for the purpose of
administering the affairs of a certain extent of the territory; and they
require a journal to bring them every day, in the midst of their own
minor concerns, some intelligence of the state of their public weal. 4
The collection of information offered on a daily or weekly basis by hundreds
of newspapers represented, for its time, a radically new way of organizing and
disseminating information. This communications medium was critical for the
development of early American democracy, inasmuch as the press tied far-
flung early American communities together into a single polity. Because
newspapers were easy to produce and distribute, no one entity, public or
private, could control the discourse. The decentralized nature of the system
offers a prime example of how to promote a true diversity of information
sources.
The contrast between the postal system's carriage of newspapers and
today's mass media could not be more striking. Whereas the decentralized
architecture of the mail system enabled the development of a diverse news
distribution medium, the highly centralized cable network poses substantial
threats to diversity. In rejecting a strict scrutiny standard for cable television
network regulation in Tumer,25 the Court acknowledged some of the
23. An important attribute of the postal system was its ability to grow to accommodate the steadily
increasing flow of news. Some dispute exists in the literature as to the exact volume of mail at tus time
and as to the proportion of newspapers in the mail; it is clear. however, that the mails were literally flooded
with newspapers. In 1794, an estimated 70% of all mailed matter was newspaper material: by 1832
newspapers took up 15 times the weight of letters in the overall national mail flow. WAYNE E. FUtiER.
THE AMERICAN MAIL: ENLARGER OF THE COMMON LIFE 117 (1972).
24. 2 ALExIS DE TOCQUEViLLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 490 (J.P. Mayer & Max Lerner eds. &
George Lawrence trans., 1966) (1835).
25. Turner, 114 . Ct. at 2464-69.
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"important technological difference[s]"26 between channelized cable television
networks and the print medium:
Although a daily newspaper and a cable operator both may enjoy
monopoly status in a given locale, the cable operator exercises far
greater control over access to the relevant medium. A daily
newspaper, no matter how secure its local monopoly, does not possess
the power to obstruct readers' access to other competing
publications .... Thus, when a newspaper asserts exclusive control
over its own news copy, it does not thereby prevent other newspapers
from being distributed to willing recipients in the same locale.
The same is not true of cable. When an individual subscribes to
cable, the physical connection between the television set and the cable
network gives the cable operator bottleneck, or gatekeeper control
over most (if not all) of the television programming that is channeled
into the subscriber's home.
27
None of the control ascribed to the cable operator by the Court in Turner
would exist in a decentralized, open-access network, just as none exists in the
print medium. 2 If it were possible to create an open-access network, the
diversity sought by the First Amendment could be realized without the
regulatory intervention at issue in Turner.
Although the diversity-promoting regulations at issue in Turner are suited
to a media regime characterized by scarcity and closed systems rather than one
characterized by an open, decentralized network architecture, a rush to
eliminate such regulations before each element of an open network is in place
would be a grave error. For example, the Turner plurality mistakenly suggests
that an increase in the number of channels available on cable systems would
justify a change in access regulations.29 The Court assumes that a mere
increase in the number of channels available would increase diversity to the
point that extensive access regulations could be reduced. Yet, even if a large
number of channels became available, the bottlenecks inherent in a centralized
network could still pose a major barrier to diversity. Furthermore, it is essential
to the spirit of the diversity principle that we keep in mind the cost of access
26. Id. at 2466.
27. Id. (emphasis added).
28. One example of a legislative effort to promote widespread development of truly open-access
networks is the Open Platform Services portion of the National Communications Competition and
Information Infrastructure Act of 1994, authored by Representative Edward Markey (D-Mass.). The Open
Platform Services legislation would require local telephone companies to offer switched, digital
telecommunications services to residential customers at a reasonable cost on a nondiscriminatory basis.
Such services could become the basis for true open-access networks. The House of Representatives passed
this legislation in 1994, but the Senate did not act upon it. See H.R. 3636, 103d Cong., 2d Sess.
§§ 101(b)(ii), 102(d)(3) (1994).
29. Turner, 114 S. Ct. at 2457 ("[Gliven the rapid advances in fiber optics and digital compression
technology, soon there may be no practical limitation on the number of speakers who may use the cable
medium.").
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for both information users and providers. A fully open, decentralized network
that is too expensive for individuals and local organizations to access cannot
fulfill the promise of diversity. Indeed, new interactive media bring the
possibility of a return to the Tornillo'" model of regulation found in the print
medium-where the press is largely free of government intervention-but only
if the new media have the open, decentralized characteristics that mirror those
of the print medium.
III. USER CONTROL: INCREASING USER CHOICE AND ELIMINATING
GOVERNMENT CONTENT REGULATION IN NEW INTERACTIVE MEDIA
As the interactive media model comes to supplement or supplant the
broadcast model of mass media, the justification for content regulation will
come increasingly into question. The rise of interactive technology raises
urgent questions about the power (if any) of government to impose content
regulations in these new media. Legislatures and courts might apply the models
established for mass media and parts of the telephone system, which tolerate
a great degree of government content control. Or they might conclude that the
First Amendment precludes content regulation of interactive media, as is the
case with the print medium. Again, the choice between these two alternatives
will depend significantly on the architectural and functional characteristics of
interactive media, as well as on the degree to which courts and legislatures pay
heed to these characteristics.
A proper understanding of interactive media leads to the conclusion that
heavy-handed content control by any level of government is inappropriate and
violates the basic First Amendment guarantee of freedom of speech. Whatever
one might conclude about the wisdom of content regulations in today's mass
media, such regulations would be inappropriate for developing interactive
media. Interactive media differ from mass media in that they offer users a
great degree of control over the content that users and their children receive.
Therefore, individual users, not the government, should be entrusted with the
task of controlling the content to which they and their families are exposed.
A. Background of Content-Based Regulation in Mass Media and the
Telephone System
The lack of user control has been the basis for an evolving tradition of
intrusive government regulation of mass media communications. In FCC v.
Pacifica Foundation,3' the Supreme Court held that comedian George Carlin
30. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241,254-58 (1974) (supporting expanszve view
of freedom of the press from government intrusion or coercion).
31. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
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was properly barred from repeating "seven dirty words" over the radio even
though they were not obscene, but only indecent.32 The Court did not analyze
application of the FCC regulations to Carlin under the standard of strict scruti-
ny; rather, the Court concluded that, given the nature of the broadcast media,
more deference was appropriate. The words might unexpectedly "assault" a
listener spinning the dial past the Pacifica station in question.33 Pacifica
upheld the FCC regulations based on the dual finding that: (1) radio has a
"uniquely pervasive presence '"" that intruded-dirty words and all-into
peoples' homes; and (2) the only way to protect children from exposure to
objectionable content was to keep it off the air altogether.3' Thus, the Court
relied on a key architectural characteristic of the broadcast medium-lack of
user control over content-to justify intrusive content regulation.
The lack of user control was also used to justify government restrictions
targeted specifically at indecent audiotext services-so-called "dial-a-porn" or
900-number services. In considering this issue Congress relied heavily on a
belief that government-imposed access restrictions were the only means
available to protect children from exposure to indecent material.36 In 1983,
Congress first amended § 223 of the Communications Act of 1934 to proscribe
the making by telephone of "any obscene or indecent communication for
commercial purposes to any person under eighteen years of age or to any other
person without that person's consent. ' 31 Subsequent FCC regulations required
that dial-a-porn providers restrict minors' access to indecent services by
securing some form of age verification before permitting a caller to receive
such services. Through several years of litigation, courts considered and
rejected a number of government regulatory schemes requiring providers to
shield minors from access to indecent information.38 Shortly after the Second
32. Id. at 735-38.
33. See id. at 748-49. The Pacifica Court recognized that the radio station in question-WBAl in Now
York City-had actually broadcast a warning as to the possibly objectionable content, id. at 730, but held
that such warnings failed to protect those who tuned in after they were given, id. at 748.
34. Id. at 748.
35. Id. at 749-50.
36. This view was perhaps best captured by the remarks of Representative Thomas Bliley (R-Va.)
during a 1988 congressional debate on the issue: "[Dial-a-pore] constitutes an attractive nuisance in every
home in America where children are present. There is no completely effective way to prevent children from
being exposed to 'indecent' or 'obscene' dial-a-pom so long as it is lawfully and commercially marketed."
134 CONG. REc. H1693 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1988) (emphasis added). Bliley went on to note:
Telephones are precisely like radio and television because of their easy accessibility to children
and the virtual impossibility for parents to monitor their use....
... [Dfial-a-porn is presently in the home whether the homeowner wants it or not. Today
one cannot have telephone service in the privacy of one's family environment without being
required to have dial-a-por with it. Families with children must give up telephone service to
be "left alone" from exposure of their children to this "intruder".
Id. at H1694 (emphasis added).
37. FCC Authorization Act of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-124, § 8(a)(3), 97 Stat. 1467, 1469-70 (1983)
(codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 223(b) (Supp. III 1991)).
38. For example, the Second Circuit first struck down time channeling rules, 49 Fed. Reg. 24,996
(1984), which required services to be accessible during hours when children were asleep, because they had
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Circuit finally upheld the 1983 statute and the FCC's third set of implementing
regulations,39 Congress tried to broaden the restrictions by enacting a total
ban on all obscene and indecent telephone communications, for adults as well
as minors.4°
In Sable Communications of California, Inc. v. FCC,4 the Court
considered a First Amendment challenge to these new dial-a-pom restrictions.
The Court noted that obscenity is not protected by the First Amendment, while
indecent communications-those that do not rise to the level of obscenity-are
protected.42  As a threshold matter, the Sable Court found that the
constitutional bases for upholding indecency regulations as articulated in
Pacifica were not applicable to any media other than over-the-air
broadcasting.43 Sable rejected Pacifica's finding of a "uniquely pervasive"
medium as "emphatically narrow" and irrelevant to other media such as
telephone audiotext services." The Court held that indecent communications
can only be limited in order to serve a compelling state interest, and then only
by using the "least restrictive means" possible." The Court did find that
protecting minors from exposure to indecent materials is a compelling state
interest, but held that the statute's broad terms-eliminating any age and
consent exceptions-were not narrowly drawn enough to serve this interest:
"[I]t is not enough that the Government's ends are compelling; the means must
be carefully tailored to achieve those ends."46 The Sable "least restrictive
means" standard became the test by which regulations on access to
constitutionally protected indecent material were judged."
The constitutionality of the current § 223 and its implementing regulations
was finally upheld by the Second Circuit in Dial Information Services v.
the effect of denying access to adults as well as children. Carlin Communications v FCC. 749 F.2d 113.
121 (2d Cir. 1984). Next, the Second Circuit rejected a requirement. 50 Fed. Reg. 42,699 (1985). that
carriers provide access to indecent services only once customers entered access codes or passwords, which
were to be issued after verification that the customer was over 18 years old. Carlin Communications. Inc
v. FCC, 787 F.2d 846, 847 (2d Cir. 1986).
39. Carlin Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 837 F.2d 546. 556 (2d Cir.). cert. denied. 488 U.S. 924
(1988) (upholding 1983 amendment to § 223 and FCC regulations permitting access to dial-a-porn where
restricted with credit cards, access codes, or scrambling devices); see 52 Fed. Reg. 17.760 (1987)
40. Pub. L. No. 100-297, § 6101, 102 Stat. 130, 424 (1988).
41. 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
42. Id. at 124-27.
43. Sable, 492 U.S. at 127.
44. Id. The Court distinguished audiotext services from over-the-air broadcasting as follows: l[Ulnlike
an unexpected outburst on a radio broadcast, the message received by one who places a call to a dial-a-por
service is not so invasive or surprising that it prevents an unwilling listener from avoiding exposure to it."
Id. at 128.
45. Id. at 125-26 (holding speech regulation acceptable provided government chooses -the least
restrictive means to further the articulated interest"); see also O'Brien v. United States. 391 U.S. 367. 377
(1968) (justifying government regulation if furthers important government interest unrelated to suppression
of free expression and if restriction on expression is no greater than necessary to further interest).
46. Sable, 492 U.S. at 126; see also Carlin Communications. Inc. v. FCC. 837 F.2d 546. 555 (2d Cir.).
cert. denied, 488 U.S. 924 (1988).
47. See, e.g., Dial Info. Servs. v. Thornburgh. 938 F.2d 1535. 1541-.42 (2d Cir. 1991). cert. denied,
502 U.S. 1072 (1992).
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Thornburgh.48 The court rested its holding on the legislative determination
that telephone company blockage of service pending age verification or use of
a credit card was the only means available to restrict children's access to
indecent audiotext services.49
Interactive media are materially different from telephone and audiotext
technology in that they offer users the ability to exercise control over precisely
what information they access. Given this dramatic difference between
telephone technology and interactive networks such as the Internet and other
online services, we believe that the constitutionality of dial-a-porn-type
regulations for interactive media would be in serious doubt." Just as the
Sable Court found broadcasting's indecency regulations inapplicable to the
telephone system because of differences in the medium, regulations designed
for audiotext services in the telephone system are constitutionally inapplicable
to interactive media.
B. Beyond Mass Media to User-Controlled Interactive Media
A medium that offers individual users the ability to exercise greater control
over the content that they (and their children) receive might reduce the
legislative zeal for content regulation. User control of this kind requires two
functional attributes in a new medium: (1) the means of identifying the content
being transmitted, and (2) the ability of the user to screen out certain kinds of
content.
Much of the information that travels across networks such as the Internet
and commercial online services such as America Online, CompuServe, and
Prodigy has identifying data, known as a header, attached to it. This header,
as distinct from the content itself, generally could contain information about
the format in which the content is stored, the category in which the
information should be classified or sorted, the owner of the content, and the
origin or destination of the content. A header might be described as the digital
analogue to a bibliographic entry that describes a book or magazine. Or we
48. 938 F.2d at 1535. The current § 223 prohibits all obscence telephone communications for
commercial purposes, as well as indecent communications available to any person under the age of 18.
Carriers must request written approval before providing access to any such service for which they collect
charges. Providers must restrict access to persons under the age of 18 in accordance with FCC regulations,
which currently require providers to use access codes, payment by credit card, or scrambling devices. Pub.
L. No. 101-166, § 521(1), 103 Stat. 1159, 1192-93 (1989) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 223(b)-(c) (Supp. III
1991)).
49. Dial Info. Seres., 938 F2d at 1541-43. Representative Bliley asserted as much in his comments
on the 1988 legislation: "(lit became clear that there was not a technological solution that would adequately
and effectively protect our children from the effects of this material. We looked for effective alternatives
to a ban-there were none." 134 CONG. REc. H1691 (daily ed. Apr. 19, 1988).
50. Moreover, given the national and international reach of new interactive media, determination of
obscenity based on traditional "community standards" doctrine raises a host of questions not addressed hero.
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might think of these headers as the equivalent of a TV Guide description of a
television program.
Existing technologies already enable users to access or to exclude certain
information based on a variety of characteristics. In the future, users, instead
of the government or network operators, could exercise control with such
filtering technology over the information content that they receive in an
interactive network environment.5' User control could be exercised in two
ways. First, users could screen out all messages or programs based on
information in the header. If a parent wanted to prevent a child from seeing a
particular movie or from participating in a particular online discussion group,
then the computer or other information appliance used by the child could be
set by the parent to screen out the objectionable content. Such features could
be protected with passwords assigned, for example, by the responsible adults
in the house. Second, the same header information and filtering systems could
be used to enable blocking of content based on third-party rating systems. For
example, those parents who accept TV Guide's judgment about the presence
of nudity and/or violence in particular programs could program their interactive
TV sets to screen out all programs that TV Guide has classified as violent.
Because of the flexibility of interactive technology, however, we need not rely
on just one rating system. In fact, a single rating system or a single set of
filters would merely replace a single government censor with a single private
censor, with no real gain for the free flow of information. Properly
implemented, interactive media can accommodate multiple filtering systems,
giving users and parents the opportunity to select and block information based
on a true diversity of criteria.52 The Christian Coalition or People for the
American Way could set up rating systems that would be available on the
network to those who desire them. Rather than relying on the judgment of the
government, or of the TV network, viewers could limit access to content based
on the judgment of a group whose values they share.
This new approach to the problem of controversial content is possible
because of a fundamental shift in media architecture. Whereas mass media
utilize broadcast technologies that "assault"-in the words of the Pacifica
Court 3-a possibly unsuspecting audience with objectionable content,
interactive media are based on an access model. Users are not bombarded with
51. This same filtering technology could be used to address privacy concerns in interactive
environments by giving users the ability to express their preferences about the future use of personally
identifiable information. These issues are beyond the scope of this Essay.
52. Nicholas Negroponte, Director of the MIT Media Lab and an authority on nteracuve media.
predicts:
When television is digital, it will have many new bits--he ones that tell you about the
others .... The bits may be the control data for a knob that allows you to change X-rated to
R-rated to PG-rated material (or the reverse). Today's TV set lets you control brightness.
volume, and channel. Tomorrow's will allow you to vary sex. violence, and political leaning.
NiCHOLAS NEGROPONTE, BEiNG DiGrrAL 49 (1995).
53. FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726. 749 (1978).
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one channel or another of programming. The choice of an interactive
architecture, with header information, makes effective screening by the
recipient possible. No longer will controversial material intrude into users'
homes in the manner that, in Congress' view, required steps to aid parents in
protecting their children. Rather, users will request that particular information
be delivered. These requests can be screened or controlled by parents if
necessary to limit their children's access to certain kinds of information.
C. Restricting Access to Controversial Content Can Be Achieved by
User-Control Technologies, Not Government Content Regulation
User-control technologies enable customers (in particular, parents) to limit
access to certain kinds of material on their TVs or PCs. With such control
mechanisms within the practical reach of parents, the goal of indecency
regulations-the protection of children-could be achieved without intrusive
government restrictions. In interactive media, the reasoning of Pacifica and
Sable would not justify content regulation at all, whether it is regulation of
sexual expression, violence, commercial speech, or other controversial
materials.
Nevertheless, political pressures threaten to introduce draconian regulations
into these new media before user-control mechanisms have a chance to take
hold. Recently, there has been a proposal in Congress to hold interactive
service providers, such as CompuServe, American Online, and commercial
Internet access providers, responsible for any obscene or indecent content that
travels across their networks, whether or not they have knowledge of the
nature of that content.-4 Even more threatening to the First Amendment, that
proposed legislation would criminalize private messages sent between
consenting adults if those messages contained any "lewd, lascivious, [or]
filthy" content.55 If carriers are to be held responsible for the content of all
information and communication on their systems, 'they will be forced to
attempt to screen all content-every e-mail message, text file, word processing
document, or image-before it is allowed to enter the system. In many cases,
this would simply be impossible. But even where it would be possible, such
prescreening would severely limit the diversity and free flow of information
in the online world. To be sure, some system operators will want to offer
services that prescreen content.56 If all systems were forced to do so,
54. See S. 314, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 2(a) (1995) (the popularly named "Exon Amendment").
55. Id.
56. For example, some commercial online services provide discussion forums in which monitors, or
editors, screen the content of the discussion in order to assure that it is appropriate for children. The
decision to screen in this manner is an exercise of editorial control on the part of the online service
provider. In general, service providers offer these moderated forums in order to attract customers who want
such a service. By the same token, online services offer completely open, unmoderated discussions because
other customers desire this kind of forum.
1634 [Vol. 104: 1619
Berman and Weitzner
however, the usefulness of digital media as communication and information-
dissemination systems would be drastically limited. Where possible, we must
avoid legal structures that force those who merely carry messages to screen
their content.
A network architecture that relies on user control would be a real
alternative to the intrusive approach now being considered and sure to be
proposed again and again. Such a media environment would give parents-or
anyone else who has particular preferences about the content of information to
which he or she is exposed-the control that courts have determined they lack
in the mass media. Goals such as the protection of children could thus be
achieved without involving the government. Of course, if interactive media
architecture does not develop with sufficient capabilities to enable parents to
control the information accessible to their children, it is likely that political
pressure will build to achieve child protection goals through government
regulation, as in the broadcast media and audiotext service realms.
IV. CONCLUSION: RENEWING THE HEART OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
This Essay offers a First Amendment wish list for the age of interactive
media. As the designers of interactive communication services make
fundamental architectural choices, the fate of the First Amendment hangs in
the balance. If a truly open network actually comes to supplement or supplant
today's mass media, there is a real possibility for a new, less-restrictive
approach to achieving long-standing First Amendment diversity goals.
Furthermore, if that network has mechanisms in place that allow users to
exercise greater control over the content they receive, it may be possible to
achieve the legitimate government purpose of protecting children from
controversial material without the intrusive regulations that govern today's
mass media. On the other hand, a network architecture favoring closed,
centralized systems could squander the democratic potential of interactive
media. A closed network-one that offered more and more channels to mass
market, least-common-denominator programming-would be a gross
disappointment in light of the media's potential.
The shape and character of our nation's communications infrastructure is
critical to our democratic values. An important component of early American
democracy was its ubiquitous mail system, which linked the new country into
a single polity through a web of information mostly contained in newspapers.
This diversity of information sources, first developed through a vibrant
distribution system even before the First Amendment was written, was a
critical part of American democracy. Benjamin Rush, a prominent Philadelphia
physician and champion of a strong central government to promote national
unity, wrote:
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For the purpose of diffusing knowledge, as well as extending the
living principle of government to every part of the united
states-every state--city-county-village-and township in the
union, should be tied together by means of the post-office. This is the
true non-electric wire of government.57
To Rush, the postal system and the newspaper dissemination that it promoted
were vital ties that would bind the country together. James Madison voiced
similar views: "In such [a government] as ours, where members are so far
removed from the eye of their constituents, an easy and prompt circulation of
public proceedings is particularly essential." 58 Without mails and newspapers,
the "people" would not have been well enough informed to participate in the
process of government.
Today, as a country and as global citizens we are awash in electric wires,
fiber-optic cables, satellite transmissions, and numerous other electronic
communication media, the likes of which would leave Benjamin Rush and the
drafters of the First Amendment in awe. Whether all of the technology that
surrounds us will advance democratic values, however, remains very much an
open question. The combination of postal system and printing press that played
such an important role in early America is technologically backward by our
standards, but its impact was powerful because of the kinds of communications
this early network enabled.
If a similar network does not develop for the new interactive media, the
prospects for the First Amendment are, indeed, somewhat bleak. We cannot
rely on our political institutions alone to sustain our First Amendment values.
Neither Congress nor the FCC has demonstrated the political will to seek
diversity in the public interest.59 As more and more people begin to use
57. Benjamin Rush, Address to the People of the United States, in AM. MUSEUM, Jan. 1787, at 8, 10.
Rush went on to note:
It is the only means of conveying heat and light to every individual in the federal
commonwealth. Sweden lost her liberties, says the abbe Raynal, because her citizens were so
scattered, that they had no means of acting in concert with each other. It should be a constant
injunction to the post-masters, to convey newspapers free of all charge for postage. They are
not only the vehicles of knowledge and intelligence, but the centinels of the liberties of our
country.
Id. (emphasis added).
58. Letter from James Madison to Edmund Pendleton (Dec. 6, 1792), quoted in RICHARD B.
KIELBowICz, NEWS IN THE MAIL: THE PRESS, POST OFFICE, AND PUBLIC INFORMATION, 1700-1860s, at
35 (1989).
59. As part of regulations implementing the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition
Act of 1992, the FCC recently had to decide whether home shopping channels were legally entitled, along
with local broadcast TV stations, to be carried on cable networks. The Commission found that home
shopping stations serve the "public interest" and therefore have the right to demand that local cable
operators carry their broadcasts, whether cable operators want to or not. 8 F.C.C.R. 5321, 5321 (1993).
Commissioner Ervin Duggan, now President of the Public Broadcasting Service, wrote a noteworthy
dissent:
Today, unfortunately, the Commission deliberately and explicitly puts forward a minimalist
definition of the public interest standard. It does so at precisely the moment when we should
be mending and refurbishing that tattered banner and lifting it high over a broadcast culture that
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interactive media-including the Internet, interactive television, and other
multimedia services-there is likely to be political pressure to censor and
regulate access to controversial information such as obscenity and indecency.
Congress has already shown its appetite for content regulation by taking
decisive and dangerous steps against the perceived growth of sexually explicit
content in the new media. We can still hope that Congress and the courts will
recognize the unique nature of interactive media and choose to regulate them
accordingly. Nonetheless, current developments provide powerful motivations
to move forward with the task of building open networks that maximize
abundance, diversity, and user control.
is, to borrow Gerard Manley Hopkins's poignant phrase, "all ... seared with trade."
In 1929, the old Radio Commission, predecessor of today's FCC, set forth its definition
of the public interest standard in words that required broadcasters to present diverse
programming including "entertainment, music of both classical and lighter grades, religion.
education and instruction, important public events, discussions of public questions, weather.
market reports and ... news." Are Congress and the Commission ready now to abandon this
ideal? I hope not, and I cast my dissent in the hope that some day Congress and the
Commission will find it possible to visit this question again.
Until we do, I will think of the public interest standard as a sort of once-handsomc
thoroughbred, so abused and neglected that it has finally broken down in the middle of the
track. Perhaps we can take it back to the paddock in the hope that, with care and love, it can
recover-or at least produce offspring that recall the beauty of the original. If not, let us simply
put the poor beast out of its misery once and for all.
Id. at 5339-40.
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